Purpose: This presentation asks whether anticipated regret is a valid ethical justification to restrict transgender youth from accessing gender-affirming care. Policymakers and practitioners express concern that trans youth may later regret transitioning and use this possibility as grounds to delay or deny care. Yet, despite its frequent appearance in policy, research, and public debate, regret is rarely well-defined or ethically substantiated. What are the conditions under which it might legitimately inform treatment decisions? What is the moral significance of anticipated regret in this context, and does regret gain influence from rhetorical force rather than from ethical merit?
Nature and Scope: This presentation addresses the conceptual foundations of regret in medical ethics and its role in treatment decisions for transgender youth.
Issue Under Consideration: What does regret mean in clinical and moral terms? What ethical weight should it carry in decision-making? Is anticipated regret ever a valid objection to gender-affirming care for young people?
Conclusion: While anticipated regret may be an important consideration in all treatment decisions, it might fail as an ethical justification for restricting access to gender-affirming care. We should question whether regret-based arguments can serve as grounds to limit care, and focus on evidenced and equitable approaches to transgender youth healthcare.
Author declares no conflict of interest.