The creation of Dolly the sheep in 1997 sparked a decade of intense debate about human cloning, culminating in legal prohibitions in many jurisdictions. Much bioethical discussion at the time focused on issues of identity, dignity, and social disruption. However, the decisive objection to human reproductive cloning was simpler: somatic cell nuclear transfer (‘SCNT’), the technique used to create Dolly the sheep, was inefficient and risky. Safety concerns and widespread public opposition arguably rendered the other ethical issues moot.
It may soon become possible to create genetic clones of existing persons using non-SCNT techniques. For example, induced pluripotent stem cells derived from a human adult’s skin fibroblast could be supported to create embryo-like constructs capable of developing into live-born humans. Such techniques fall outside the scope of many jurisdictions’ prohibitions of SCNT-based cloning.
How should the law respond? One option is to close any legal loopholes permitting ‘de facto cloning.’ Another is to re-open the cloning debate. New cloning techniques may prove much safer than SCNT, and public attitudes towards (at least some forms of) cloning will have shifted since the late 1990s and early 2000s – as they have for other once-controversial family arrangements. Under these conditions, a strong case could be made against prohibiting ‘de facto cloning’, and perhaps in favour of explicitly allowing it. This view is made particularly plausible by the absence of any decisive philosophical objections to safe human reproductive cloning – or so I shall argue.