It is generally assumed that those who would conscientiously object should do so on the basis of a universal or absolute moral opposition to whatever it is that one objects to. This is particularly clear in the context of military drafts. Those seeking to be recognised as a conscientious objector must take the view that the use of violence is always morally wrong. Thus, conscientious objectors cannot selectively object to some wars and not others, they must object to all wars in principle. Although there has been some discussion of selective conscientious objection in the bioethics literature, a universalist approach has generally been adopted, albeit in a largely implicit manner. The presumption is that those who would conscientiously object to abortion must opt out of any and all provision. Equally, those who wish to opt out of being involved in MAiD should presumptively object to the practice in all circumstances. However, recent changes to MAiD legislation in Canada means it now sets forth two tracks for accessing the procedure. Track 1 applies where natural death is reasonable foreseen. Track 2 applies when this is not the case. It may be that some healthcare professionals are morally comfortable with the provision of MAiD under Track 1 criteria do not feel similarly about Track 2 cases. Thus, some may object to the provision of MAiD under Track 2 but not Track 1. This presentation will examine this possibility and what it might imply for the notion of (selective) conscientious objection (in healthcare).